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General Michel Aoun’s election to the presidency of the Republic 
of Lebanon at the end of October has fuelled fears among Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon that their situation may deteriorate further. Some 
of them even predict the implementation of a forced-return policy 
to their homeland. In fact, in very recent months, representatives of 
Aoun’s party (the Free Patriotic Movement) were at the forefront of an 
anti-refugee discourse. In his inaugural speech to parliament, Aoun 
reiterated that “there will be no solution in Syria without the return of 
the Syrian refugees to their country”. 
However, Lebanon’s new president will probably only have limited 
room for manoeuvre on this issue. In fact, the Lebanese government 
adopted a new policy in October 2014, whose primary aim is to 
preserve stability and security by maintaining Syrian refugees in 
illegality. This strategy reflects a broad consensus of the Lebanese 
political class and is therefore unlikely to change in the near future. 
The question is whether – and for how long – managing a quasi-status 
quo can guarantee Lebanon’s stability in the medium and long term. 
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1) The tightening of State policies towards 
Syrian refugees
Lebanon has the highest per-capita concentration of 
refugees worldwide. Based on Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs’ figures, on 31 October 2016, of 
around 5.9 million residents in Lebanon, the total number 
of refugees in the country was estimated at around 
1,500,000. The number of Syrian refugees registered with 
the UNHCR in Lebanon, who are officially considered 
to be ‘displaced people’ by the Lebanese authorities, 
reached 1,017,433. This figure has remained relatively 
stable since early 2015, when the Lebanese government 
began implementing a more restrictive policy towards 
Syrian refugees. Since then, the situation of the latter has 
continued to deteriorate significantly. 
In October 2014, the Lebanese government approved 
a Policy Paper on Syrian Refugee Displacement, which 
aimed to reduce the numbers of Syrian refugees in the 
country, to ensure security by increasing the regulation 
of the Syrian population, and to ease burdens on the 
infrastructure. This policy became effective in January 
2015, when the General Security closed the borders 
and introduced a new Entry and Renewal of Residency 
Permit. Two months later, the Lebanese government 
requested that the UNHCR suspends new registrations 
of Syrian refugees. The new regulations have led to 
around 70-80% of Syrian refugees being left without legal 
residency permits. 
As pointed out by several well-documented reports 
published in 2016 by Lebanese and international NGOs,1 
the lack of legal status for the overwhelming majority of 
Syrian refugees has significantly increased their socio-
economic vulnerability and put their safety at risk.  
Indeed, the 2015 regulations have created de facto at 
least three main categories of refugees: a minority of 
wealthy Syrians who can obtain a three-year residency 
permit; Syrians who were previously registered with the 
UNHCR, who have been requested to sign a pledge not 
to work and some receive very little compensation; and 
1. Human Rights Watch, “I just wanted to be treated like a person”: How 
Lebanon’s Residency Rules Facilitate Abuse of Syrian Refugees? January 
2016; Lebanon Support, Formal Informality, Brokering Mechanisms, and 
Illegality, June 2016; Lebanese Center for Human Rights, Legal Chal-
lenges Faced by Refugees from Syria in Lebanon, October 2016; The Legal 
Agenda, Regulating the Residence of Syrians in Lebanon, A Legal Petition 
to Prevent Vulnerability, Seminar organised on 10 November 2016.
unregistered Syrians who wish to work within the three 
sectors legally opened to them (agriculture, construction 
and environmental sectors), who have to obtain a pledge 
of responsibility by a Lebanese sponsor. 
This policy has opened the door to practises such as 
temporary arrests at checkpoints, arbitrary detentions, 
and the imposition of curfews for Syrian refugees in certain 
municipalities. There has also been a rise in labour and 
sexual exploitation among the most vulnerable refugees 
(especially women and children who represent three-
quarters of the Syrian refugees) by Lebanese sponsors, 
employers and landlords. These practises particularly 
affect those refugees living in approximately 1,900 
informal settlements across Lebanon, most of which are 
located in the most deprived areas of the country (the 
North and the Bekaa Valley). In contrast, the refugee 
families whose breadwinners had worked in Lebanon 
before 2011 seem to benefit from more protection from 
the Lebanese host communities. 
More broadly, the 2015 regulations have trapped Syrian 
refugees in a vicious circle. Their lack of legal status has 
limited their freedom of movement, notably for males. It 
has also caused limited access to livelihoods, education 
and health services, as well as more informal work.2 In 
2015, 70% of Syrian refugees lived below the extreme 
poverty line for Lebanon (versus 49% in 2014) and nearly 
90% of them were in debt. 
Such deterioration in their living environment has led 
thousands of Syrians, who had sought refuge in Lebanon, 
to move onward to third countries (most of them to 
Turkey, then illegally to Europe) in 2015. However, in 
January 2016, as part of its agreement with the European 
Union, Turkey also adopted new regulations. Syrians 
coming from Lebanon are now required to hold a visa to 
enter Turkey by air or by sea. Since then, Syrians have felt 
trapped in Lebanon. They cannot escape their precarious 
conditions, unless they return to Syria (which is not an 
option for the majority under the current circumstances) 
or travel to the few countries that do not require them to 
possess an entry visa (Sudan and Malaysia). 
2. Ibid. See also Lebanon Support, Syrian Refugees’ Livelihoods. The Im-
pact of Progressively Constrained Legislations and Increased Informal-
ity on Syrians’ Daily Lives, September 2016; Lebanon Support, Access to 
Healthcare for Syrian Refugees. The Impact of Fragmented Service Provi-
sion on Syrians’ Daily Lives, November 2016. 
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In this context, negative discourse against refugees, hailed 
by both Lebanon’s political class and its population, has 
grown in echo to the increasing pressure on Lebanese 
infrastructure caused by a population growth of more than 
30% in less than 5 years. This discourse is partly rooted in 
the complex history of the relationship between the two 
neighbouring countries.3 It is also fuelled by ideological 
and political motivations, especially among Christian 
(historically) and Shia (currently) parties, which perceive 
the ‘implantation’ of a mostly Sunni refugee population 
as a challenge to the confessional balance of the Lebanese 
political system. 
Lebanese politicians, regardless of their political 
affiliation, have increasingly called for the ‘safe return’ of 
refugees to Syria. At the UN General Assembly Summit in 
September, Foreign Minister Bassil stressed the necessity 
to identify and send refugees to safe zones in Syria, and 
Prime Minister Salam called for “a detailed roadmap for 
the safe and honourable return of the Syrian refugees who 
are present in Lebanon”4. These ideas (some of which had 
already been discussed in the past, such as the creation of 
safe areas by imposing no-fly zones in Syria) are judged 
as unrealistic by most representatives of UN and human 
rights organisations. So far, it has not been possible to 
concretely translate these ideas into the situation on the 
ground, not only because they violate the international 
non-refoulement regulations, but above all because they 
could contradict the strategic interests of some of the 
main Lebanese actors. Indeed, Hezbollah, whose military 
intervention in Syria has led to an influx of Syrian refugees 
into Lebanon, is unlikely to favor the Syrian refugees’ 
return in the areas that he has sanctuarised. A potential 
return of Syrian refugees to their country would thus have 
to take place within the framework of the demographic-
transfer policy set up by the Syrian regime in Damascus.
Finally, these discourses might reflect a strategy of the 
Lebanese political class in order to put more pressure 
on international donors to obtain increased financial 
support. Yet, they also reflect the real difficulties faced by 
the Lebanese government in finding sustainable solutions 
to the long-running crisis of the Lebanese institutions 
that has been exacerbated by the Syrian refugee crisis.  
3. Elisabeth Picard, Liban-Syrie Intimes Etrangers, Actes Sud, Paris, 2016.
4. Kareem Chehayeb, Lebanon’s New Presidency May Enact Anti-Refugee 
Agenda, 10 November 2016, Refugees Deeply. 
2)  Low effectiveness of the international 
support provided to Lebanon
While more restrictive measures were taken by the 
Lebanese authorities, the international community has 
provided the latter with increased financial and technical 
support. The main objective was to enable Lebanon to 
contain the refugee population within its borders without 
undermining the country’s social, economic and security 
stability. International organisations and UN agencies 
have worked in close cooperation with some ministries 
(Social Affairs, Interior and Foreign Affairs), as well 
as with international and Lebanese NGOs, and more 
recently with municipalities, to address the prolonged 
socio-economic and security impact of the refugee crisis. 
Despite growing involvement from international actors 
over the last two years, Syrians in Lebanon remain in a 
vulnerable and precarious situation. 
Since 2012, with a special focus on security, international 
donors, mostly European, have begun to provide support 
to better secure and control the Lebanese borders.5 In 
2014, the Lebanese government then agreed to cooperate 
with the UN on the development of the Lebanon Crisis 
Response Plan (LCRP)6. This ‘integrated humanitarian 
and stabilisation strategy’, implemented in 2015, aimed 
to ensure humanitarian assistance and protection for 
the most vulnerable displaced people from Syria and the 
poorest Lebanese people;7 and to strengthen the capacity 
and quality of the national and local service-delivery 
systems. 
Only half of the funding that was initially required to 
implement the LCRP was provided in 2015. In February 
2016, the London conference aimed to raise new funding 
to meet the needs of those most affected in Syria and its 
neighbouring countries. In its own attempt to secure 
increased funding, the Lebanese government pledged 
to promote two programmes that focused on education 
and economic opportunities for Syrian refugees and the 
Lebanese alike. In September 2016, $857 million from the 
5. ‘Integrated Border Management in Lebanon’, funded by the European 
Union, started in October 2012 and ends in December 2018. Many other 
programmes have been designed, such as the ‘UK Train and equip part-
nership with the Lebanese Army Forces’ or the ‘Danish Project to sup-
port Land border security in Lebanon 2015-2018’. 
6. Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016.
7. There are an estimated 3.3 million people in need, of whom 1.5 million 
are vulnerable Lebanese, 1.5 million are displaced Syrians and 300,000 
are Palestinian refugees.
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London pledges were disbursed in Lebanon (and $572.4 
million have been planned/committed for 2017).8 In 
addition, on 15 November the EU announced that new 
funds were available for Lebanon, to be used with the 
aim of addressing the impact of the Syrian crisis.9 Finally, 
the 2017-2020 LRCP, to be adopted by the end of 2016, 
is likely to follow the same framework as previous plans, 
including the ‘social stability sector’, which focuses on 
direct support to municipalities. 
While it is too early to present a comprehensive assessment 
of the impact of the recent financial commitments 
(and other bilateral funding) on the Syrian refugees’ 
condition, Lebanon appears to have done little compared 
to Jordan and Turkey.10 Despite lengthy negotiations 
between the UNHCR and the Lebanese government, 
there has been no significant improvement on the issue 
of residency permits, which remains the top priority for 
Syrian refugees in Lebanon.11 Moreover, a Syrian refugee 
without a valid legal residency permit can try to obtain 
a new one, but he has to leave the country (in general to 
Sudan) before finding a new sponsorship in Lebanon to 
renew his residency permit papers. 
With regard to education, Lebanon has taken some 
positive steps to enrol around 200,000 Syrian children in 
formal schools in 2015-2016. Yet, an estimated 250,000 
primary and secondary-level Syrian children did not 
attend school in July 2016.12 This lack of attendance 
is mainly due to safety and economic reasons, but also 
due to the governmental policy’s inadequate responses 
8. Supporting Syria and the region; and Post-London Conference Financial 
Tracking Report: Co-hosts’ statement, 3 November 2016. At the London 
Conference in February 2016, $6 billion of pledges were made for 2016, 
and a further $6.1 for 2017-2020. In September 2016, $4.7 billion of the 
pledges for 2016 have been disbursed. 
9. The agreement foresees a minimum EU allocation of $400 million in 
2016-2017. “In turn, Lebanon commits to ease the temporary stay of Syr-
ian refugees, in particular regarding their residency status”. “EU and 
Lebanon adopt partnership priorities and compact”, 15 November2016.
10.  For example, the Jordanian government has issued more than 26,000 
work permits to Syrians in recent months.
11.  Since last June, the ‘pledge to not work’ has been substituted by a ‘pledge 
of responsibility to comply with the Lebanese law’, and alternative, 
people living in informal camps now require alternative documents to 
renew their residency permit. These changes have not yet been imple-
mented everywhere.
12. Human Right Watch, ‘Growing up Without an Education’, Barriers to 
Education for Syrian Refugee Children in Lebanon, 19 July 2016. Hana 
A. El-Ghali, Nadine Ghalayini, and Ghida Ismail, Responding to Crisis: 
Syrian refugee Education in Lebanon, Policy Brief, Issam Fares Institute 
for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Bei-
rut, March 2016. 
to meeting the needs of Syrian children (such as the 
schools’ location, which is often far from the refugees’ 
accommodation; the lack of a free transportation system; 
the content of the Lebanese curricula; and harassment 
towards Syrian children in some public schools).
Finally, the programme, which aims to promote the 
creation of “300,000 to 350,000 jobs, 60% of which could 
be for Syrians”13 as ‘temporary jobs’, has not taken any 
concrete shape yet. It is improbable that the programme 
can offer a sustainable solution to the employment crisis 
that pre-existed the refugee crisis. The labour market, 
which has been characterised by the ubiquity of the 
informal sector and the lack of public-policy planning for 
years, needs in-depth reform.
Conclusions and recommendations
Despite the Syrian refugee crisis’s profound impact on 
Lebanon, social tensions have so far rarely escalated 
into widespread violence. This relative stability has 
been firstly the product of the massive, albeit imperfect 
and objectionable, intervention of international actors. 
It can also be explained by the self-restraint posture of 
both Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees, 
who share great concern that the generalised violence 
from Syria will spill over into Lebanon. Finally, the 
fragile stability of Lebanon is paradoxically also due to 
entrenched political divisions in the Lebanese scene. 
These divisions have indeed prevented the adoption of 
new measures that would have likely had even worse 
consequences for Syrian refugees than those that were 
already approved in October 2014. 
The presidential election and the expected formation of a 
new government are unlikely to cause a dramatic change 
in the Syrian refugees’ situation, as the Lebanese political 
scene will remain divided and focused on preparing the 
parliamentary elections that are scheduled for May 2017. 
However, the spread of populist and racist discourse 
against refugees, as well as the continued deterioration of 
the most vulnerable population’s daily lives are likely to 
aggravate social tensions and to considerably weaken the 
already feeble ties between Syrian refugees and Lebanese 
public institutions. 
13. London Conference – Lebanon Statement of Intent, February 2016.
5 ■ Increasing Vulnerability for the Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: what’s next?
In this sensitive and complex context, international 
actors have limited scope for action, especially since 
most European countries have adopted a very restrictive 
asylum policy towards Syrian refugees. Nevertheless, the 
European States involved in crisis management should 
try to alter some negative trends by acting immediately 
to:
1. Provide support to the Lebanese authorities to set up 
a long-term development strategy that respects both the 
international human rights conventions and the need for 
Lebanon to preserve its social and economic stability. 
International donors should continue to negotiate 
with the Lebanese authorities to improve the legal, 
educational, housing and economic situation of Syrian 
refugees in the short term, in return for increased funds 
to Lebanon (‘conditional funding’). A more human-
rights-based approach for Syrian refugees would include, 
at least, the adoption of clear, simplified and uniform 
rules and procedures that enable all Syrian refugees to 
obtain legal status; as well as regulation and control of the 
sponsorship system – if it is not abolished ‒ and all forms 
of exploitation and abuse against refugees. 
2. Improve their funding and aid mechanisms to reach 
the most vulnerable population in Lebanon. Insufficient 
funding is only one part of the problem and must be 
treated. But many other dysfunctions, such as widespread 
corruption, have prevented Lebanon from successfully 
meeting the needs of the most affected populations. 
Transparency mechanisms should be set up at all levels of 
the humanitarian response (from donors to UN agencies, 
ministries and the non-governmental sector). 
3. Strengthen constructive collaboration between 
international actors and the Lebanese authorities on the 
one hand, and between the Lebanese government and the 
non-governmental sector on the other hand, to reduce 
the deep trust crisis between Syrian refugees, the UN and 
the Lebanese authorities. It should be a priority to include 
Syrian civil society organisations, which are most likely to 
outreach refugee communities, in the Lebanese response 
plan. This requires easing restrictive policies around 
residency and work, especially for Syrians who are active 
within CSOs. 
4. Maintain extreme vigilance in the face of official 
Lebanese calls for the ‘safe return’ of Syrian refugees to 
their country, and at the same time work to create the 
minimum conditions for a ‘voluntary return’, namely the 
imposition of a lasting ceasefire, an acceptable political 
transition, and the beginning of infrastructures and 
public services’ reconstruction in Syria. In the medium 
term, international donors should integrate an approach 
that is based on a needs assessment to rebuild post-
conflict Syria into their current assistance programmes 
for Syrian refugees in Lebanon (notably in education, 
vocational training and employment). 
6 ■  MED | Policy Brief | Issue 2016/03 | November 2016
Middle East Directions
 
The MIDDLE EAST DIRECTIONS Programme, created in 2016, is part of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
(RSCAS). It has the ambition to become an international reference point for research on the Middle East and North Africa 
Region, studying socio-political, economic and religious trends and transformations. The programme produces academic 
outputs such as working papers and e-books. It also liaises with policy makers with a wide range of policy briefs, policy report 
and analysis.
Middle East Directions
Robert Schuman Centre  
for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Via Boccaccio, 121
50133 Florence
Italy 
Contact:
email: med@eui.eu  website: middleeastdirections.eu
Content © Authors, 2016
© European University Institute, 2016
QM
-0
6-
16
-3
37
-E
N-
N
doi:10.2870/388671
ISBN:978-92-9084-449-5
